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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 241 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 06/08/1998 
Where it occurred: Qualat (Zabul), 
Garmab 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
metal fragments 
Date record created: 17/02/2004 Date  last modified: 17/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
request for long handtool (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available in 
September 1999. The following summarises its content. 
At the time of the accident the demining group was using a one-man drill and two-man 
teams. 
The victim had been a deminer for seven years. He had last been on leave 13 days before 
and last attended a revision course five months before. The accident occurred on ground 
described as grazing land in "medium condition". The mine was identified from pieces found 
at the site. 
The investigators decided that the victim was working with a detector when he got a signal 
from a fragment that was visible, half buried. He squatted to remove it with his bayonet but 
as he did so initiated a mine that was under the fragment. His visor "was not properly down" 
and he failed to centre the reading point and approach it at the angle dictated by the SOPs. 
The victim suffered injuries to his hands and his face, the latter including a lacerated lip and 
damaged teeth. The victim walked to the safe area. 
The victim's visor and bayonet were damaged. 
He was treated on site and taken to the ICRC hospital in Kandahar. 
The Team Leader said that the deminer was careless when the accident occurred but had 
found six mines over the last few days and was a good deminer. He suggested that such 
incidents could be avoided by allowing the use of a pick, by bolting visors in a down position 
and by persuaded deminers to apply procedures. 
The Section Leader said that the victim was working properly with his visor down when the 
accident occurred. The victim prodded too close to the reading which caused the accident. 
The victim said he was prodding with a bayonet when the accident occurred and may have 
used it at the wrong angle. He claimed to have placed markers as required. He said that 
such incidents could be prevented if a pick was used instead, that detectors should work 
properly, and that the reading was investigated in a prone position. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim prodded in a squatting position at the wrong 
angle at the centre of a detector reading without lowering his visor. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that deminers should treat all readings as a mine, prodding 
should always be done prone, that even visible fragments should be prodded using proper 
procedures and that supervisors should ensure that procedures are properly adhered to 
"especially prodding when a small mistake could be the last one". 
Photocopies of photographs of the damaged visor and bayonet were not clear. The bayonet 




Victim number: 314 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
2 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: helmet 
 







See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
An initial casualty report recorded the injuries as: 
"Both eye injury and mult small wounds on the face and chest and laceration of lower lip. 
Semicomatose." 
The field report and medic's sketch did not include details of injuries.  
The field doctor described the injuries as: "both eye injuries. Face injury. Multiple injury on 
chest. Injury on index finger". 
The victim reported injuries on his face, right hand and "lap". 
A photocopy of a photograph of the victim in the file provided no detail at all.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the 
victim was not wearing his visor properly from which I infer that he was inadequately 
supervised. Neither his "controlling" partner not the Team Leader told him to lower his visor. 
It is also possible that the visor was too damaged to see through properly (as was seen 
frequently during 1998, 1999), in which case the failure to provide useable protective 
equipment represents a management failing.  
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in 
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of 
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt SOPs for local conditions, or enforce 
their own standards may be seen as a further management failing. 
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